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It is not news that we often make discoveries or find reasons for a mathematical 
proposition by thinking alone. But does any of this thinking count as conducting a 
thought experiment? The answer to that question is “yes”, but without refinement the 
question is uninteresting. Suppose you want to know whether the equation 
[ 8x + 12y = 6 ] has a solution in the integers. You might mentally substitute some 
integer values for the variables and calculate. In that case you would be mentally 
trying something out, experimenting with particular integer values, in order to test the 
hypothesis that the equation has no solution in the integers. Not getting a solution 
first time, you might repeat the thought experiment with different integer inputs.  
The fact that there are such mundane thought experiments is no surprise and does 
not answer the question we are really interested in.2 The numerical thought 
experiment just given involves nothing more than applying mathematically prescribed 
rules (such as rules of substitution and calculation) to selected inputs. It would be 
more interesting if there were mathematical thought experiments in which the 
experimental thinking goes beyond application of mathematically prescribed rules, by 
using sensory imagination as a way of eliciting the benefits of past perceptual 
experience.3 In what follows we will try to show that there are such thought 
experiments and to assess their epistemic worth.  
Our method will be to present some candidate thought experiments with what we 
hope is enough background explanation and in sufficient detail for you, the reader, to 
perform the relevant mental operations yourself; without this participation the paper 
will be neither convincing nor engaging. We have tried to avoid run of the mill 
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examples by staying out of universally familiar mathematical areas; but to keep the 
material accessible, the examples are mathematically quite simple, with something a 
bit more advanced reserved for the end. The paper has three main parts, 
corresponding to the mathematical areas from which the examples are drawn: knot 
theory, graph theory and geometric group theory. In the last two parts later 
exposition depends on earlier; so the material is best read in the order presented. 
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1. CANDIDATES FROM KNOT THEORY  
Preliminaries  
For the examples to be intelligible, some background about knots in mathematics is 
needed. Here it is with a minimum of technical detail.  
A knot is a tame closed non-self-intersecting curve in Euclidean 3-space. 
The word “tame” here stands for a property intended to rule out certain pathological 
cases, such as curves with infinitely nested knotting. Knots are just the tame curves 
in Euclidean 3-space which are homeomorphic to a circle.4 In Figure 1 on the left is a 
diagram of a knot and on the right a pathological case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A knot has a specific geometric shape, size and axis-relative position, but if it is 
made of suitable material, such as flexible yarn that is stretchable and shrinkable, it 
can be transformed into other knots without cutting or gluing. Since our interest in a 
knot is the nature of its knottedness regardless of shape, size or axis-relative 
position, the real focus of interest is not just the knot but all its possible transforms. A 
way to think of this is to imagine a knot transforming continuously, so that every 
possible transform is realized at some time. Then the thing of central interest would 
be the object that persists over time in varying forms, with knots strictly so called 
being the things captured in each particular freeze frame. Mathematically, we 
represent the relevant entity as an equivalence class of knots. 
Two knots are equivalent  iff one can be smoothly deformed into the other by 
stretching, shrinking, twisting, flipping, repositioning or in any other way that 
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Figure 1 
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does not involve cutting, gluing, passing one strand through another or 
eliminating a knotted part by shrinking it down to a point. 5  
In practice equivalent knots are treated as the same, with a knot strictly so called 
regarded as just one of the forms a knot can take. This practice will be followed here. 
More precisely, the word ‘knot’ without the qualification ‘strict’  will be used to refer to 
an equivaIence class of strict knots. Figure 2 presents  diagrams of the same knot. 
 
 
 
Diagrams like these are not merely illustrations; they also have an operational role in 
knot theory. But not any picture of a knot will do for this purpose. We need to specify:  
A knot diagram is a regular projection of a strict knot onto a plane (as viewed 
from above) which, where there is a crossing, tells us which strand passes over 
the other. 
Regularity here is a combination of conditions. In particular, regularity entails that not 
more than two points of the strict knot project to the same point on the plane, and 
that two points of the strict knot project to the same point on the plane only where 
there is a crossing. 
A knot diagram with one or more crossings tells us at each crossing which strand 
passes over the other, but it does not tell us how far above the other it goes. So 
distinct strict knots can have the same knot diagram. But this does no harm, because 
strict knots with the same knot diagram are equivalent.  This is all the background we 
need in order to proceed to examples. 
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A thought experiment with knots 
An important and obvious fact is that a knot has many knot diagrams. As we 
represent knots by knot diagrams, a major task of knot theory is to find ways of 
telling whether two knot diagrams are diagrams of the same knot. In particular we 
will want to know if a given knot diagram is a diagram of the unknot, which is the only 
knot representable by a knot diagram without crossings. To warm up, here are some 
exercises. Using your visual imagination on the two knot diagrams in Figure 3, see if 
you can tell whether either is a diagram of the unknot. 
Figure 3 
 
 
In fact it is not possible to deform the knot represented on the left so that the result is 
a diagram without crossings, but you will probably have no difficulty with the one on 
the right. Figure 4 indicates a simple way. 
 Figure 4 
 
 
Before considering what you can reasonably conclude from the results of your 
efforts,  try to visualize deforming the knot represented by this more complicated 
knot diagram, Figure 5, to get a diagram without crossings.  
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Figure 5 
 
It can be done, but it is difficult without actually producing physical diagrams 
representing the knot at one or more intermediate stages of the complete 
deformation. To conduct this thought experiment one performs one or more trials, a 
trial being a finite sequence of steps, each of which consists of (a) visualizing a 
deformation in 3-space of a knot as represented by one seen diagram and (b) 
drawing (or otherwise producing) another knot diagram corresponding to the 
projection of the knot at the end of the visualized deformation so far. The experiment 
has a positive outcome when one of the trials ends with a diagram which has no 
crossing.  Figure 6 illustrates the intermediate stages of a successful trial for this 
case. The dashed section of each diagram indicates the part about to be moved or 
the part just moved.   
Figure 6 
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Assessment and objections 
One charge laid against so-called thought experiments in physics is that they are not 
experiments at all, but ‘merely picturesque arguments’ for a claim that is already 
believed.6  Is that true of the process of visual imagining and diagram making just 
described? Picturesque it may be. But one may embark on the process in order to 
find out whether the knot represented by the initial diagram in Figure 6 (matching 
Figure 5) is an unknot, lacking any conviction either way; one may even doubt that it 
is the unknot. So one may really be experimenting, in the sense of performing a 
series of actions in order to test the hypothesis that the original diagram is a diagram 
of the unknot.  
Granting that it is a genuine experiment, another worry concerns its epistemic value.  
Can we really make discoveries this way, relying heavily on visual imagination? Are 
we not simply replacing proper experiments by ‘fantasies of the imagination’7? There 
is an important distinction between veridical imagining and fantastical imagining.8 
Veridical imagining is aimed at finding out the true answer to some question, and is 
constrained by the accumulated effects of past perceptual experience. Of course this 
does not make veridical imagining infallible; the adjective “veridical” is intended to 
describe an aim, not a result, of imagining. Fantastical imagining is not constrained 
in that way, as it is not aimed at answering a question, but serves psychological ends 
such as wish-fulfilment, horror thrill, sensory fascination and so on. Veridical 
imagining is common and useful. Wanting a desk for a particular room, you visit a 
furniture showroom; there you see an attractive desk, somewhat bigger than you had 
in mind. Would it fit reasonably well into the room with its other furniture? In this 
situation it is reasonable to visualize the room to reach a judgement. This is veridical 
imagining. Other examples readily come to mind: Can I prepare a tolerable evening 
meal from the ingredients I now have at my disposal? Can five normal adults sit 
comfortably in my car? We do in fact rely on sensory imagination to answer such 
questions, and we get correct answers frequently enough for this practice to persist.  
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This still leaves open the question of epistemic value in this case. Here are two 
questions we need to answer:  
(1) Can our visual imagination be sufficiently reliable here?  
(2) How do we reliably reach a conclusion about a mathematical question from 
information about physical situations? 
The question of reliability is a serious one when trying to imagine deformations 
starting from a complicated knot diagram. But in our case the complexity is quite 
small and there is no real worry. Let us call a maximal part of a knot diagram 
between undercrossings an arc. Then the first step in Figure 6 involves flipping the 
rightmost arc over the central part of the diagram and shrinking it until it falls just 
within the leftmost arc. This clearly preserves knot identity (up to equivalence, of 
course). The remaining steps are clearly identity preserving atomic moves known as 
Reidemeister moves.9 When one makes a non-atomic move in getting from one 
diagram to another, as in the first step of Figure 6, one can check its permissibility by 
seeing if one can break it down into a sequence of Reidemeister moves. Returning 
to the rightmost diagram of Figure 3, it is easy to see that (with two Reidemeister 
moves) it can be turned into a diagram without crossings, as shown in Figure 4. So 
the answer to the first question is: yes, a person’s visual imagination can be (and 
often is) sufficiently reliable for this task. Your own experience in following the 
examples should provide you with supporting evidence. 
In these cases we are visualizing a physical possibility, at least partly based on 
experience with string, yarn, cotton thread or suchlike. How do we get from an 
empirical discovery of a physical possibility to a mathematical possibility? The highly 
informal way in which the subject has been presented here hides the conceptual 
distance between the physical thought and the corresponding mathematical 
proposition. In these cases the conclusion is that a strict knot which projects the 
starting diagram is ambient isotopic to a strict knot which projects a diagram without 
crossings. But what does “ambient isotopic” mean? To get a sense of the full 
mathematical content of such a claim, note first that a strict knot is mathematically 
identified with a homeomorphism  from the unit circle S1 into R3 (not the image of S1 
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under the homeomorphism), with an additional condition on the homeomorphism to 
rule out wild knots10. Ambient isotopy is defined as follows: 
Strict knots 0 and 1 are ambient isotopic iff there is a continuous map 
F: R3[0,1]  R3 such that for each r in [0,1], F(x, r) is a homeomorphism of R3, 
F(x, 0) is the identity map on R3, and F(x, 1)  0 = 1. 
This definition makes clear that visualizing alone does not enable us to discover a 
full mathematical fact expressed in saying, of two strict knots, that they are ambient 
isotopic. This is because one cannot tell by visualizing alone that there is a 
continuous map fulfilling the stated conditions. But we have been assuming that 
visualizing can make it reasonable to believe the mathematical claim and lead to 
discovery. How is this possible? 
The answer is that these visual thought experiments take place in the context of 
background knowledge about the links between the mathematical definitions and 
idealised physical objects and transformations that can be visualized. These links 
belong to what is referred to as the foundational aspect of knot theory, and often 
expositions of the foundations reveal that the mathematical definitions are tailored to 
represent the intended kind of visualizable objects and transformations. Sometimes 
promising definitions are put forward only for the sake of showing their inadequacy 
for representing the intended visualizable material, before proper definitions are 
given.11  Moreover, mathematically inequivalent definitions of tame knots are given in 
different texts, but it is known that each adequately represents what is intended, 
much as real numbers can be defined as Dedekind cuts of rational numbers or as 
Cauchy equivalence classes of Cauchy convergent sequences of rational numbers. 
For foundational purposes there needs to be some way of fixing the subject matter in 
mathematical terms, so that the correctness of basic assumptions and methods can 
be proven. But once that job has been done, we may proceed without adverting to 
our foundational definitions. This is the situation with regard to basic knot theory. The 
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foundational definitions are needed for proving Reidemeister’s Theorem: two strict 
knots are equivalent if and only if there is a finite sequence of Reidemeister moves 
taking a diagram of one to a diagram of the other. Once that has been established 
we can go a long way with visual thought experiments.   
 
Another example: the trefoil and the unknot 
Let us return to the leftmost diagram of Figure 3, reproduced in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 
 
 
This is a trefoil knot. If you have been visualizing properly your attempts to visualize 
a deformation of this trefoil so that it projects a diagram without crossings will have 
been unsuccessful. After a few trials you may have become convinced that this 
trefoil is not the unknot. The diagram is cognitively quite simple. So, unless your 
visual imagination is poor, a few negative trials provides evidence that the trefoil is 
not the unknot.  
For more conclusive evidence, we can use a knot invariant known as colourability12.  
A knot diagram is colourable if and only if each of its arcs can be coloured one of 
three different colours so that (a) at least two colours are used and (b) at each 
crossing the three arcs are all coloured the same or all coloured differently.  
Colourability is a knot invariant in the sense that if one diagram of a knot is 
colourable every diagram of that knot is colourable.13 This fact can be proved using 
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Reidemeister’s theorem. Since any diagram of a knot can be reached from any other 
diagram of that knot by a finite sequence of Reidemeister moves, to prove the 
invariance of colourability it suffices to show that if a Reidemeister move is 
performed on a colourable knot diagram the resulting diagram is again colourable.  
A standard diagram of the unknot, a diagram without crossings, is clearly not 
colourable because it has only one arc (the whole thing) and two colours cannot be 
used. So in order to show that the trefoil is distinct from the unknot, it suffices to 
show that the trefoil diagram is colourable. So here is a thought experiment to test 
the hypothesis that the trefoil represented in Figure 7 is colourable: while looking at 
the diagram, visualize each of the arcs as coloured red, green or blue  using at least 
two colours; alternatively, when looking at the diagram mentally label each arc with 
one of the words “red”, “green” or “blue” using at least two of them.14 Then check that 
at each crossing all three arcs have the same colour or all three have different 
colours.   
Because the trefoil diagram of Figure 7 is visually so simple, this thought experiment 
can be carried out reliably, thereby giving the thinker very strong reason to believe 
that the trefoil is colourable, as in fact it is, hence not equivalent to the unknot. With 
more complicated diagrams, it is difficult to hold the relevant information in visual 
imagination, and one is forced to colour or label arcs on the page or screen and then 
check that the conditions are met.  
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2. EXAMPLES WITH GRAPHS  
Cycle graphs 
We often represent mathematical objects by a configuration of dots connected by 
line segments, such as a tree or a cycle. This gives rise to the algebraic notion of a 
graph G which consists of a set VG, the ‘vertices’ of G, and a set EG of pairs of 
members of VG, the ‘edges’ of G.
15  We will be concerned with cycle graphs:  
G is a cycle graph iff VG = {v1, v2, …, vk}  for k  3 and every edge in EG occurs 
just once in the sequence {v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, …, {vn, vn+1}, …, {vk, v1}. 
A cycle graph has an obvious representation as a regular polygon; there are just as 
many edges as vertices. The spatial representation of graphs makes us notice not 
only kinds of graphs, but also various graph-theoretic properties and relations. The 
following are relevant examples. 
A path between vertices u and v is a non-empty sequence of edges {y1, y2}, 
{y2, y3} , …, {yn-2, yn-1}, {yn-1, yn}, with the yj distinct, and u = y1 and v = yn .  
A graph is connected iff between any two of its vertices there is a path.  
The length of a path is the number of edges in the path. 
For connected graphs we have the following notions of distance and diameter:  
This distance between two vertices u and v, d(u, v) = the length of a shortest path 
between u and v.  
The diameter of a graph is the maximum distance between vertices, i.e. 
max {d(x, y) : x, y  VG}. 
With these definitions at our disposal, we can proceed to our initial example. 
Suppose we want to express the diameter of a cycle graph with n vertices in terms of 
n. A thought experiment can help us here. Imagine the vertices of the graph to be 
small but heavy pearls of equal size and weight, adjacent pearls connected by a 
fixed unit length of strong flexible thread, like a necklace. Then imagine holding the 
necklace by any one pearl, letting the rest of it go. What will happen? The rest will 
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fall as far as the thread will let it; so the maximum distance between the top pearl 
(the held pearl) and any other will be the number of units of thread (representing 
edges) between the top pearl and a lowest pearl. What if we hold the necklace by 
any other pearl, say k units of thread further on? As the necklace is a cycle, by 
visualizing what happens each time we rotate the necklace by a unit, we can tell that 
the configuration made by the hanging necklace remains unchanged, and so the 
distance between the new top pearl and the new lowest pearl (or pearls) will be the 
same. So the number of units of thread between the top pearl and a lowest pearl is 
the maximum distance between pearls. This represents the diameter of the graph. 
But what is this number, for a given number n of unit threads in the whole necklace? 
The thought experiment continues. We now visualize the dangling necklace with 
fine-grained attention to discover its form. At the top is a single pearl with its two 
neighbouring pearls hanging next to each other at a distance of one unit below the 
top; if there are at least two more pearls, the next pair of pearls will hang at distance 
of two units from the top; if there are at least two more, the next pair will hang at a 
distance of three from the top, and so on. That will be the same whether the number 
of pearls is even or odd. Now visualize the lowest few pearls of the dangling 
necklace. How will they be arranged? If the number is odd, below the top pearl the 
remaining pearls will hang in pairs, the lowest pair having a unit of thread connecting 
them, illustrated on the left in Figure 8. If the number is even, at one unit below the 
top pearl will be one pair of pearls, at one unit below them another pair of pearls, and 
so on until we run out of pairs and just one pearl remains (as the total number of 
pearls is even). By visualizing attentively the bottom of the image necklace in this 
situation, one can discern that this lowest single pearl will be connected by unit 
threads to each of the lowest pair of pearls just above it, as on the right in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 
   
 
 
 
 
Odd Even 
14 
 
 
To make use of these results, we reason as follows. Let the total number of unit 
threads (edges) be n. If n is even, we notice that there are two equal length paths 
from top to bottom; so we merely need to divide by 2. If n is odd, noticing that the 
thread between the bottom pair of pearls does not belong to any path between top 
and bottom pearls, we subtract that one thread from the total; then we can notice 
that there are two equal length paths from the top to either bottom pearl; so we only 
need to divide the remaining n1 edges by 2. Either way we get n/2, the greatest 
integer  n/2. So here is a discovery one can make with the help of a thought 
experiment: the diameter of a cycle graph with exactly n vertices is n/2.  
To assess this candidate thought experiment, the two questions we need to answer 
are: (1) Is what we have called a thought experiment in this case really an 
experiment, as opposed to a picturesque argument for a claim already believed? (2) 
Given that it is an experiment with certain outcomes, is it a reliable way of getting 
those outcomes? 
The relevant mental actions here are (a) visualizing the cycle graph as a physical 
object, the necklace of pearls, and then visually imagining the result of holding the 
necklace by one pearl while letting go of the rest of it, (b) visualizing what happens to 
the configuration as we change top pearls, going from one pearl to an adjacent pearl, 
and (c) visualizing the spatial forms of the result of letting the necklace dangle, for 
odd and even numbers of pearls, with special attention to the top and the bottom. It 
seems right to say that parts and (a) and (b) are unrevealing: we already know that 
the necklace will dangle, pulled down by gravity as far as the connecting thread will 
allow, and that changing the pearl by which the necklace is held will leave the 
configuration unchanged. Part (c), however, may be revealing. Finer-grained 
imagery results from taking into account the parity information. The forms of the 
lower end of the necklace in the two cases are revealed to us by the visualizing.  So 
(a) followed by (b) and then (c) constitutes a series of mental actions, not to test a 
hypothesis, but to find the forms the necklace would take. That is a thought 
experiment. The results of the experiment are the forms we find; we use them as 
input to further thinking leading to our mathematical conclusion. 
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Is our visual imagination reliable here? If you agree that we would get the same 
results if we performed the experiment physically with actual necklaces matching the 
description in the thought experiment, you should accept that this use of visual 
imagination is reliable.16 This is not surprising: our visual experience of physical 
situations relevantly similar to the described situation is sufficiently extensive to 
produce reliable dispositions for veridical imagining. Mathematically the result is 
quite trivial. For something a bit more interesting mathematically we focus on Cayley 
graphs.       
 
Cayley graphs 
Cayley graphs are representations of groups with a finite set of generators. Recall 
that a group is a set G together with a binary function xy satisfying exactly these 
conditions: 
Closure:   For all x, y in G, xy is in G. 
Associativity:   For all x, y, z in G,  (xy )z  =   x(y z). 
Identity:   For some z in G, for every x in G,  xz = x = zx 
Inverse:   For any z in G satisfying the identity condition, for every x in G there is 
a y in G such that xy = z = yx.     
It is easy to prove from the identity condition that there is just one identity, often 
denoted e. It is easy to prove from the inverse condition that each member x of G 
has just one inverse, denoted x1. As  is associative, we can omit brackets and the 
function symbol and use juxtaposition instead. This improves legibility.17  
Let S be a finite subset of G. S is a set of generators for G iff every member of G is 
the product of a finite sequence of members of S or their inverses. More formally, 
putting S1 for the set of inverses of members of S, this is:  
For every x in G, there are yi (1  i  n) in SS
1 such that x = y1y2…yn .  
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 We clearly could perform this experiment physically as well as in thought; the same goes for the 
thought experiments on knots illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. This refutes Buzzoni’s claim that a 
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‘On Mathematical Thought Experiments’ Epistemologia  XXXIV (2011), pp. 61-88. 
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1
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1
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In this case, ((G, ), S), usually written simply (G, S), is a generated group. Here are 
some examples of finitely generated groups: 
 Let n be an integer greater than 2. The domain of the group is the set Cn of 
rotations of a regular n-sided polygon about its centre by k2/n radians for 
integers k. The function  is composition. Let anticlockwise rotation by 2/n be 
the sole generator.  
 The set of integers Z under addition, with generator 1.  
 The set S3 of permutations of a triple {a, b, c} under composition, with 
generators {r, f}, where r (for ‘rotation’) takes a, b, c to c, a, b, and f (for 
‘flip’) takes a, b, c to c, b, a.18   
Some groups are not finitely generated. An example is the set Q of rationals under 
addition.19 Many finitely generated groups have different sets of generators. For 
example, C5 is generated by { 2/5 }; it is also generated by { 4/5 }. The group 
(Z, +) is generated by { 1 }; it is also generated by { 2, 3 }.20 
Cayley graphs represent finitely generated groups in the following way: each group 
member is represented by a unique vertex, and each vertex represents exactly one 
group member; for any group member g and generator s there is a directed edge 
from the vertex representing g to the vertex representing sg.21  
Let us look at some examples. A graph for C6 is suggested by the general 
geometrical description of Cn given above. Put c for the generator, anticlockwise 
rotation by 2/6 radians; for k  0, put ck for this operation repeated k times, that is, 
anticlockwise rotation by k2/6 radians, and ck for clockwise rotation by k2/6 
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 S3 is also the group of symmetries of an equilateral triangle. If we take a, b, and c to be vertices of 
an equilateral triangle, r (rotation) and f (flip) are obvious operations (symmetries) of the triangle.  
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 Take any finite set of rationals with denominators d1 , d2 , . . . , dn . Any sum of those rationals could 
be expressed as a rational n/m with denominator m =  d1  d2  . . .  dn. But not all rationals could be 
so expressed: consider p/q where p and q are primes and q  m. 
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 To see that {4/5} generates C5, note that a sequence of three anticlockwise rotations by 4/5 = 
anti-clockwise rotation by 2/5; two anticlockwise rotations by 4/5 = clockwise rotation by 2/5. To 
see that {2, 3} generates Z note that +3+(2) = +1 and +2+(3) = 1. 
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 As the group operation is so often function composition, we maintain the convention that s applied 
to g (i.e. s after g) is sg, so that an edge goes from g to sg.  
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radians. Put e for the identity, that is, anticlockwise rotation by 2.  We can represent 
this generated group as in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the generated group (Z, +, { 1 }) is infinite, we can only show part of its graph, as 
in Figure 10; but it is obvious how it continues. The identity e is 0, the sole generator 
is 1 and any integer n results from adding 1 or 1 |n| times.  
Figure 10 
 
 
 
 
Groups with two or more generators have more complicated structures than their 
single generator counterparts. This can be seen by comparing diagrams of their 
Cayley graphs. Here are a couple of examples. Figure 11 is a diagram of the Cayley 
graph of (Z, +, { 2, 3 }). We use different colours for composition with the different 
generators, black for an edge from n to n+2 and red for an edge from n to n+3. 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 depicts the graph of S3 with generators r and f. We use red for an edge 
from x to rx and black for an edge from x to fx.  Also, for each generator s which is its 
own inverse, there will be two edges between adjacent vertices, one from x to sx, the 
other from sx to x, as x = ssx. In this case it is visually easier to read the image if we 
merge the two edges using arrowheads both ways. We do this for edges between x 
and fx, as f (= flip) is its own inverse.  
Figure 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although in practice we often ignore the difference between the visual image and the 
graph, they are not the same, as there can be visually divergent images of the same 
graph. The lines could be arcs of a circle, for instance; or the shape, size and 
positioning of polygonal faces can be changed without changing the graph. Figure 13 
for example shows the graph of S3 with generators {r, f} as a prism (without labels). 
Figure 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Cayley graph of a finitely generated group represented by these diverse images 
is a graph-theoretic object, not a drawing. We can be precise about this. Let G be a 
e 
r rr 
rf 
f 
fr
f 
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group generated by a finite set S. The Cayley graph of (G, S) is the graph (V, E) with 
V = G and E = the set of ordered22 pairs x, sx for x in G and s in S.  
Why bother with the visible diagrams of Cayley graphs? Because they can help us 
grasp the nature of the Cayley graphs they represent; they can help us reason about 
them; they can suggest to us hypotheses about them; they can help us to discover or 
explain facts about them.23   
Here is a simple example. Recall that a single line segment with arrowheads both 
ways represents two edges with opposite directions between the same pair of 
vertices. Then inspection of the visual representations of graphs so far will show that 
all the vertices of a graph have the same number of edges coming into them and the 
same number leaving them. Is this true for all Cayley graphs? A little reflection 
shows that it is. Let v be any vertex of the Cayley graph of (G, S). Then for each s in 
S, v, sv is an edge leaving v; moreover, every edge leaving v is v, sv for some s in 
S. So the total number of edges leaving v is |S|. Again, for each s in S, s1v, v is an 
edge into v (as v = ss1v)  and all edges into v are of this form. So the total number of 
edges into v is |S|. So all vertices of the graph have the same number of edges 
coming in and the same number leaving: in the terminology of graph theory, every 
Cayley graph is regular. In this case, visual inspection of some visual graphs (the 
standard visual representations of Cayley graphs) led to a general conjecture about 
Cayley graphs (the mathematical entities), a conjecture that is confirmed by 
reasoning.   
 
Thought experiments with Cayley graphs: vertex transitivity 
In the case just considered, attentive visual inspection of the visual graphs 
suggested a conjecture. Now we claim that operations in visual imagination can do 
                                            
22
 The pairs are ordered because all edges of a Cayley graph have a direction. Notice that edges can 
run in both directions between a given pair of vertices: both e, f and f, e are edges in the Cayley 
graph represented by Figure 12. 
 
23
 For more on the roles of diagrams of Cayley graphs see the following articles by Irina Starikova: 
"Why Do Mathematicians Need Different Ways to Present Mathematical Objects? The Case of Cayley 
Graphs", Topoi 29(1), (2010), pp. 41-51; "From Practice to New Concepts: Geometric Properties of 
Groups", Philosophia Scientiae, 16(1), (2012), pp. 129-151. 
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the same kind of work. Looking at the visual graph for C6 with anticlockwise rotation 
through 2/6 as generator, it is clear that we can move any vertex to any other by a 
transformation of the whole configuration that maps vertices one-to-one onto 
vertices, in such a way that edge relations are preserved. Putting g for the mapping, 
this means that  v, w is an edge if and only if g(v), g(w) is an edge. The 
transformation is simply a rotation of the whole about the centre by as much as is 
required to take v to w, and this is made obvious to us by visual imagination.  
A one-to-one mapping of the vertices of a graph onto those vertices (i.e. a 
permutation of the vertices) which preserves edge relations is said to be an 
automorphism of the graph. So the property of the Cayley graph of (C6, {r}) which 
visual imagination revealed to us is this: for any of its vertices v and w there is an 
automorphism which maps v to w. A graph with this property is said to be vertex 
transitive.  
For the finite cyclic groups (Cn, {r}) and the infinite cyclic group (Z, {1}),finding an 
automorphism is very easy. Take any v and w in the group. If v = w, the identity 
function does the job. Otherwise, there will be some non-zero integer k such that w = 
rkv. This is k rotations through 2/n (or k unit translations) with direction depending 
on whether k is negative or not. But this same operation applied to all members of 
the group will preserve edge relations of the Cayley graph, as can be recognised 
from visualizing the operation on the graph as a whole.  
What about finitely generated groups with more than one generator? Let us look at 
the Cayley graph for S3 with generators r and f as depicted in Figure 13, the prism. A 
red directed edge represents one application of r, i.e. a step from a vertex v to a 
vertex rv ; a black edge is the merging of two edges with opposite directions, each 
representing one application of f. Let v and w be any distinct vertices. The thought 
experiments involve visualizing spatial operations on the whole prism until one finds 
one (or a sequence of them) which maps v to w and takes edges to edges without 
exception. There are three possibilities to consider. In each case we describe a 
visualizable operation (sequence) which clearly does the job.  
(1) v and w belong to the same triangle, that is, w = rv or w = r2v. Visualize a rotation 
of the whole prism about the axis through the centre of both triangles (the ‘horizontal’ 
axis) by one or two thirds of a revolution in the direction of the red edge from v. For 
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example, let v and w be as in Figure 14. Anti-clockwise rotation of the whole prism 
by two thirds of a revolution maps v to w leaving edge relations undisturbed.24  
 
Figure 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) v and w lie at opposite ends of the same black edge. Then reflection in a plane 
parallel to the triangles cutting the prism in half maps each vertex with its counterpart 
at the other end of a black edge and preserves edge relations. This is the mapping 
that takes each x to fx. An alternative is to rotate anticlockwise about the horizontal 
axis until the black edge between v and w is at the top, then rotate about the vertical 
axis through the centre by half a revolution as in Figure 15. If v and w start at the 
bottom left edge, this is the mapping that takes each x to fr2x. 
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 We should be careful here when specifying the mapping mathematically, because the whole-prism 
rotation does not coincide with rotation r of the group: for x in the near triangle the mapping takes x to 
rx, but for x in the far triangle it takes x to r
1
x. 
v 
w 
22 
 
Figure 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3)  v and w do not lie at opposite ends of the same black edge and do not belong to 
the red same triangle. It is easiest to consider two cases. (i) Let v and w be 
diagonally opposite vertices on the bottom face of the prism. Then a half revolution 
about the vertical axis as in Figure 15 takes v to w and leaves edge relations 
undisturbed. (ii) Let just one of v and w be a vertex at the top of a triangle. Then half 
a revolution about the vertical axis followed by one or two thirds of an anti-clockwise 
revolution, will take v to w and preserve edge relations.  
We can visualize these whole-prism operations using a picture of the prism with 
vertices appropriately labelled v and w, and in so doing we readily discern that 
vertices are mapped one-to-one onto vertices and that edges are taken to edges. 
This is not surprising. Each whole-prism revolution we have mentioned is a bijection 
of vertices onto vertices which preserves edge relations; so the composite operation 
of performing one of these revolutions after another is a bijection which preserves 
edge relations: a composition of automorphisms is an automorphism.    
We can conclude that for any v and w in the Cayley graph of S3 there is an 
automorphism taking v to w: the Cayley graph is vertex transitive. What if we replace 
the triangular faces of the prism with matching regular polygons of more than three 
sides? The same three cases for pairs of distinct vertices need to be considered 
(with reference to triangles replaced by reference to n-gons), and using a power of 
schematic imagination it is not difficult to discern that the same kinds of 
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transformation will provide the needed automorphisms. The only difference is that in 
this case, the whole-prism rotations about the central horizontal axis which are 
available to us are k/n of a revolution for each integer k such that 1 k  n, instead of 
1/3 or 2/3 of a revolution. As this works regardless of the number of polygon sides, 
we have a way of telling that the Cayley graphs of an infinite class of groups with two 
generators (the dihedral groups Dn) are vertex transitive.  
Against the background knowledge that all groups with a single generator (the cyclic 
groups) have vertex transitive graphs, this finding raises the questions: Is the Cayley 
graph of every group with two generators vertex transitive? Is every Cayley graph 
vertex transitive? There are many kinds of groups with two generators that we have 
not considered; so it would be wrong to regard the thought experiments described 
here as providing significant evidence for the hypothesis that all  2-generated groups 
have vertex transitive graphs. A fortiori our thought experiments do not provide much 
evidence for the hypothesis that all Cayley graphs are vertex transitive.  But the 
outcomes of our thought experiments make these hypotheses worthy of 
investigation, by trying to find a proof or a counterexample. In fact there is a fairly 
straightforward proof that every Cayley graph is vertex transitive.  
What we have shown is that in some cases one can use one’s visual imagination to 
find the required automorphisms, without already knowing that there are any, hence 
in a truly experimental way. This active use of visual imagery, first studied by 
cognitive scientists in the 1970s,25 is a useful part of the toolkit of mathematicians 
and students of mathematics, though the results are usually recorded symbolically, 
without trace of the mental experimentation which led to them. The utility of visual 
imagination depends on confining our efforts to images and image transformations 
which are simple enough for us to manipulate reliably in imagination. But the variety 
of images and image transformations that we can handle reliably suffices to make 
visual imagination a potent instrument of mental experimentation in mathematics.     
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 Shepard, R. and Cooper, L. (ed.s), Mental Images and Their Transformations. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press 1982. 
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3. A CASE FROM GEOMETRIC GROUP THEORY 
The example we will now present is the first step of a revolutionary advance in 
geometric group theory due to Russian mathematician Mikhail Gromov. To keep the 
exposition short and digestible, we omit some of the technical details.  
If S and T are distinct finite subsets of a group G and both generate G, the Cayley 
graphs (G, S)  and (G, T) will not in general be isomorphic. For example, the Cayley 
graphs of (Z, {1}) and (Z, {2, 3}), illustrated by Figures 10 and 11, are not 
isomorphic. How, if at all, can we use Cayley graphs of a group to discover 
properties of the group itself, that is, properties which are invariant with respect to 
generating sets?  
The seminal thought is that we may be able to find group properties which do not 
depend on the generating set by ignoring the fine-grained local features of the 
different Cayely graphs of a given group and attending only to the coarse, global 
features shared by all the group’s Cayley graphs. But how, given a particular Cayley 
graph of a group, can we tell what its coarse global features are?  
A Cayley graph of an infinite (finitely generated) group is an infinite graph; so only 
finite portions of it can be visually represented. But we can imagine viewing ever 
larger portions of the graph in the hope that large scale features of the group may 
emerge. We can give this idea mathematical articulation by regarding a Cayley 
graph as a metric space, as follows.  
For every pair g, h of members of a generated group (G, S) there is at least one path 
in its Cayley graph from g to h. The length of a path is just the length of the 
sequence of consecutively adjacent edges which constitutes the path, and the 
distance between g and h, denoted dS(g, h), is the length of a shortest path starting 
at g and ending at h. This distance function is the shortest path metric. 26 Viewing 
ever larger portions of the Cayley graph amounts to successively viewing diagrams 
representing the parts of the Cayley graph containing vertices at most n units away 
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 This shortest path metric dS is the same as the word metric for (G, S). Suppose each element of S 
is assigned a unique name of the form “sk”. Let a symbol of the form “sk
1” name the inverse of what is 
named by “sk”. A word in S is a finite sequence of elements of the form “sk” or “sk
1”, so that a word 
denotes a product of members of G. The word metric for (G, S) is defined: dS(g, h) = least length of a 
word w in S such that w denotes hg
1
. Note that left multiplying g by hg
1
 takes g to h. 
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from the identity e, for increasing n.27  We call this kind of visual transformation 
‘zooming out’. 
Now let G be any infinite group with different finite sets of generators S, T and 
maybe others. From a visual representation of the Cayley graph of (G, S) or (G, T) – 
it does not matter which – we can try zooming out in visual imagination so far that 
the fine details of the Cayley graph are lost and features of the large scale geometry 
(or ‘coarse’ geometry) of the object now come into view. The hope is that the large 
scale geometry is the same for whichever Cayley graph we start with, that is, 
regardless of generating set. If this works, then we might find that algebraic 
properties of the group G itself, properties which are invariant with respect to 
generating set, can be discovered by attending to the coarse geometry of the object 
we reach by zooming out. Here is how Gromov put it: 
This space [the space of the Cayley graph of  = (G, S) with the shortest path 
metric] may appear boring and uneventful to a geometer’s eye since it is discrete 
and the traditional local (e.g. topological and infinitesimal) machinery does not run 
in . To regain the geometric perspective one has to change his/her position and 
move the observation point far away from . Then the metric in  seen from a 
distance d becomes the original distance divided by d and for d   the points in 
 coalesce into a connected continuous solid unity which occupies the visual 
horizon without any gaps or holes and fills the geometer’s heart with joy.28        
To get Gromov’s point one must bear in mind that a Caley graph is not a geometric 
object: its ‘edges’ are just pairs of vertices and so contain no points between 
endpoints. A Cayley graph with shortest path metric is a metric space, but the metric 
(the distance function) is discrete, as the distance between any two vertices is a non-
negative integer. By ‘moving the observation point far away from’ the Cayley graph 
metric space (that is, by zooming out from it), the discrete object is transformed in 
appearance into a space with a dense and continuous metric, having (non-negative) 
real values.  
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 In customary terms, we bring into view (representations of) the n-balls for (G, S) for increasing n, 
where the n-ball = {g G: dS(e, g)  n}.    
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 Gromov, M. ‘Asymptotic invariants of infinite groups’ In Niblo and Roller (ed.s), Geometric group 
theory. Volume 2 London Mathematical Society Lecture Notes 182, (Cambridge University Press 
1993).   
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What happens if we imagine zooming out from a visual presentation of a Cayley 
graph? If, actually looking at one, we zoomed out perceptually far enough the whole 
thing would disappear from view. To avoid this, an idealization is involved in our 
mental exercise: we suppose that while distances between vertices shrink as we 
zoom out, the vertices themselves do not fade at all. The experimental question is: 
what would happen to one’s view of a standard diagram of a Cayley graph as one 
moved the observation point away by distances without upper bound, if vertices 
remained in view like points of starlight? What kind of space would emerge as a 
result? The answer depends on the Cayley graph one starts with, and is obtained by 
a combination of visual imagination and physical reasoning.  
What happens then to standard diagrams of Cayley graphs of (Z, {1}) and (Z, {2, 3}), 
shown partially in Figures 10 and 11? Both become indistinguishable from the 
traditional representation of the real numbers as a single uninterrupted line without 
ends. In this case at least, differences due to different generating sets have been 
wiped out, as desired. What happens to the integer points of the plane 
(ZxZ, {1, 0, 0, 1})? The vertices in each horizontal string coalesce, and at the 
same time the vertices in each vertical string coalesce; that is, spaces between the 
points shrink and disappear, resulting in a continuous plane. What happens to the 
appearance of a finite Cayley graph as we imagine zooming out? Eventually its 
vertices coalesce to a single tiny dot. Does this nullify the whole exercise? Not at all: 
we are looking for asymptotic properties, properties that emerge at the limit of 
zooming out or properties that emerge at a late stage and persist, and so our focus 
is naturally on infinite groups (with finite generating sets.) 
There is no reason to think that what we have described as an idealized mental 
operation of zooming out in visual imagination is really a disguised argument for 
something we already believe. For the question would then arise how we came to 
believe it, if not by the kind of thinking we describe. It is true that there is more to the 
mental operation than a simple transformation in visual imagination, for we add 
conditions. We ask how the appearance of the diagram of the Cayley graph of 
(Z, {2, 3}), for instance, would be transformed by zooming out under the condition 
that vertices remained visible, though not necessarily distinguishable. This indicates 
that the cognitive processes involved are complicated and probably also not fully 
open to introspection. But it is clear that visual imagination of a spatial change is 
27 
 
involved and that the thinking as a whole does not reduce to the application of 
mathematically prescribed rules. Reliability is going to be limited by the fact that the 
kind of spaces we can easily visualize are Euclidean or embeddable in a Euclidean 
space. But the examples given fall within these limits.  
The direct outcomes of these experiments do not count as mathematical results and, 
as just mentioned, the outcomes are limited. This is not a problem, because the real 
rewards of the zooming-out thought experiments are not their direct outcomes, but 
their effects in suggesting three mathematical possibilities. First, zooming-out 
suggests that there is a way of filtering out differences due to the different generating 
sets of the same group. Secondly, zooming out suggests that there is a way of 
thinking of an infinite generated group in terms of a metric space with a continuous 
metric (so that a group may have properties determined by geometric properties of 
the continuous metric space). Thirdly, zooming out suggests that we will sometimes 
get the same continuous metric space from distinct groups (not just the same group 
with different generating sets), perhaps giving us an equivalence relation on groups. 
To benefit mathematically from these effects, we need to find a mathematically 
precise account of a suitable relation that holds between the Cayley graph of a 
finitely generated group (G, S) with the shortest path metric – call it (G, S) – and the 
continuous metric space we arrive at by zooming out from (G, S). The relation is 
suitable only if for any infinite group G generated by finite subsets S and T, (G, S) 
and (G, T) stand in this relation to the same continuous metric space. 
The mathematization of the intuitive relation meeting these requirements is so neat 
that we present it now. An isometric mapping between metric spaces is one that 
preserves distances; a quasi-isometric mapping is one that preserves distances to 
within fixed linear bounds: 
A map f from (S, d) to (S', d') is a quasi-isometric mapping iff there are real 
constants K  0 and L  0 such that for all x, y in S 
d(x, y) /L   K     d'( f (x), f (y) )    L.d(x, y)  +K.  
Quasi-isometric mappings are not in general surjective on the intended target space, 
and we will fail to capture the intuitive relation if we impose surjectivity as an extra 
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condition.29 But we would like to find an equivalence relation on metric spaces which 
is a suitable loosening of isometry. So some extra condition is needed. The condition 
is that the mapping be surjective to within a fixed bound. Precisely put, the mapping f 
from (S, d) to (S', d')  is quasi-surjective on S' iff there is a real constant M  0 such 
that every point of S' is no further than M away from some point in the image of S 
under f. Putting these together, we define: 
A map f from (S, d) to (S', d') is a quasi-isometry iff f is a quasi-surjective quasi-
isometric mapping from (S, d) to (S', d'). 
(S, d) is quasi-isometric to (S', d') iff there is a quasi-isometry from (S, d) to (S', d').     
This is an equivalence relation, which works as intended. First, a discrete space can 
be quasi-isometric to a dense continuous space. The inclusion (identity) mapping 
from (Z, {1}) to R, with constants L = 1 and K = 0, is a quasi-isometric mapping; 
and it is quasi-surjective as every real number is at most 1/2 a unit distance away 
from an integer. So (Z, {1}) is quasi-isometric to R with standard distance metric.30  
Moreover, (Z, {2, 3}) also is quasi-isometric to R with standard distance metric; so 
(Z, {1}) and (Z, {2, 3}) are quasi-isometric spaces. This fact generalizes: for any 
infinite group G with finite generating sets S and T, (G, S) and (G, T) are quasi-
isometric spaces, as intended. This means that properties of G which are quasi-
isometric invariants will be independent of the choice of generating set, and therefore 
informative about the group itself.  
Furthermore, for some different groups G and H with generating sets S and S' 
respectively (G, S) and (H, S') are quasi-isometric; in this case the groups G and 
H are said to be quasi-isometric. So finitely generated infinite groups fall into 
equivalence classes modulo quasi-isometry.  
Finally, an immensely rewarding outcome: there are some kinds K of geometric 
space such that groups with Cayley graph spaces which are quasi-isometric to a 
space of kind K (though not necessarily the same space) share significant algebraic 
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 This is because the intuitive relation holds between ((Z, {1}) and  R with the normal distance 
metric, but |R|  |Z|; so|there is no surjection from Z to R. 
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 For a quasi-isometry from R to Z, the mapping which takes each real number r to the nearest 
integer or, if r is half-way between integers, to the greatest integer less than r, is a quasi-isometric 
mapping (with L = 1 and K = 1) and is surjective, hence trivially quasi-surjective.       
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properties. This turns out to be the case for groups which are quasi-isometric to 
hyperbolic geodesic spaces, but that is a story for another occasion.31 
 
4. SUMMARY AND DEFENCE 
We have presented examples from knot theory, graph theory and geometric group 
theory of a kind of thinking which involves active use of visual imagination and goes 
beyond the application of mathematically prescribed rules, as a way of answering 
questions or overcoming obstacles. Is a trefoil knot equivalent to the unknot?  What 
is the diameter of a cyclic graph in terms of the number of its edges?  Is the Cayley 
graph of (S3, {f, r}) vertex transitive? What spatial representations enable us to 
discover properties of a finitely generated group which are invariant with respect to 
generating sets?  
Our impression is that the role (or roles) of this kind of experimental thinking in the 
advance of mathematical knowledge is under-appreciated, though we have not 
justified that opinion here. Our aim has been merely to substantiate the view that 
there are thought experiments in mathematics which involve visualization of physical 
situations or transformations, often with an idealised aspect. 
These visual thought experiments neither are, nor serve in place of, mathematical 
proofs of the conclusions reached, even when those conclusions are true and the 
thought experiments are reliable ways of reaching them. But we hope that the cases 
we have presented support our view that the thought experiments can give the 
thinker good reason to believe them.  
This raises a general philosophical worry. If visual thought experiments of the kinds 
we have described can provide reasons for mathematical beliefs, they would provide 
empirical reasons. But mathematics, as opposed to the application of mathematics to 
non-mathematical subject matter, is an a priori science. How then can there be 
empirical evidence for a mathematical fact? 
The main problem here lies with the dictum that mathematics is an a priori science. It 
is ambiguous. If it means that any knowable mathematical truth can be known 
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 See Starikova, I. "From Practice to New Concepts: Geometric Properties of Groups", Philosophia 
Scientiae, 16 (1), (2012), pp. 129-151. 
 
30 
 
without empirical justification, it is consistent with the claim that we can have 
empirical reasons for believing a mathematical proposition. But it may mean 
something much stronger, ruling out the possibility that we can have empirical 
reasons for believing a mathematical proposition. If the dictum has this stronger 
meaning, so much the worse for the dictum. Here is a simple example. How many 
vertices does a cube have? Your background knowledge includes the facts that 
cubes do not vary in shape and that material cubes will not differ from geometrically 
perfect cubes in number of vertices. To find out the answer one can inspect a 
material cube and count its vertices. (Or you can visualize a cube to find four at the 
top surface and four at the bottom.) The visual experience in this case provides 
evidence for your conclusion that a cube has 8 vertices. “But is this really a 
mathematical fact?” Why not? It is a very simple fact, but we can extend the 
problem: Do all platonic solids have the same Euler characteristic? Surely the 
answer to that is a mathematical fact. And it can be verified in the same way. 
Physical models of each of the five platonic solids can be visually inspected to find 
out whether V  E  F is the same for all of them. The visual inspection provides 
empirical evidence for a positive answer. There are plenty of other examples, and a 
good case can be made that our initial knowledge of some single-digit addition facts 
is acquired empirically, from experiences of counting.  
Empirical evidence has a much larger role in the epistemology of actual 
mathematical belief acquisition than is often thought. Even so, one may resist the 
idea that visual imagination is a way of providing us with empirical evidence. But 
visual imagination is not just a way of indulging in fantasy. It is also a way of 
harnessing the amalgamated memories of past experiences of visual perception to 
come to conclusions about physical situations. In this role it provides empirical 
evidence. Of course there is always the question, for any particular use of visual 
imagination to answer a question, whether it is reliable. There is no general test for 
reliability, but in the context of mathematics we have a way of resolving doubts: we 
look for a proof.  
For these reasons we see no general bar to accepting that full blooded thought 
experiments are instruments, alongside proofs, for the advancement of mathematical 
knowledge.   
